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Abstract 
Having a female firstborn child significantly increases the probability that a woman’s first 
marriage breaks up. Recent work has exploited this exogenous variation to measure the effect 
of marital breakup on economic outcomes, and has concluded that divorce has little effect on 
women’s average household income. Employing an Abadie (2003) technique that allows us 
to look at the impact of marital breakup throughout the income distribution, however, we find 
that divorce greatly increases the probability that a woman lives in a household with income 
in the bottom quartile. While women partially offset the loss of spousal earnings with child 
support, welfare, combining households, and substantially increasing their labor supply, 
divorce significantly increases the odds that a woman with children is poor. 
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1. Introduction and Motivation 
 
The poverty rate for single mothers fell substantially between 1974 and 2002.  
Over the same period, the poverty rate for married mothers remained virtually 
unchanged.  Given these facts, one might assume that women with children are less likely 
to be poor than they were 30 years ago.  In fact, however, the overall poverty rate for 
women with children rose slightly over this period, from .120 to .137 (Figure 1).   
A clue to resolving this puzzle may be found in the fact that divorce and single 
parenthood have been increasing dramatically over the past several decades throughout 
the developed world.  In the United States, the proportion of mothers who are single rose 
from about 16 percent in 1974 to roughly 26 percent in 2002.  It appears that in the 
absence of this trend, overall poverty rates would have decreased, rather than increased. 
Current political discussions commonly assume that marriage has causal 
economic effects on women and children.  In particular, recent welfare legislation 
encourages marriage as a method of increasing income and reducing the need or 
eligibility for welfare.  President Bush's 2006 budget proposal earmarks $1 billion of its 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF, or welfare) budget for a five-year 
initiative “supporting healthy marriages”;1 five states allocate some of their general 
TANF budget to marriage promotion activities, and ten states provide cash marriage 
incentives in the structure of their TANF benefits.2   
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "FY2006 Budget in Brief." 
http://www.hhs.gov/budget/06budget/acf.html 
2 Gardiner, Karen, Michael Fishman, Plamen Nikolov, Asaph Glosser, and Stephanie Laud. 
"State Policies to Promote Marriage:  Final Report."  U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 2002. 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/marriage02f/report.htm 
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Despite the assumptions made in popular debate, a causal relationship between 
marriage preservation and poverty reduction has not been demonstrated.  Previous 
research has established the need for instrumental variable (IV) analysis in order to 
identify any effect of marital status on women’s outcomes (Becker, Landes, and Michael 
1977; Becker 1985; Angrist and Evans 1998; Gruber 2000).  Recently, first-born child 
sex has emerged as an instrument for marital status, facilitating estimates of causality 
(Morgan and Pollard 2002, Lundberg and Rose 2003, Dahl and Moretti 2004).  Using 
that instrument, Bedard and Deschenes (2005) conclude that “IV results cast doubt on the 
widely held view that divorce causes large declines in economic status for women” (p. 
411).  While it is true that the correlation between mean income and divorce appears to 
be driven by selection, we demonstrate in this paper that a conclusion based on effects at 
the mean is misleading.  IV results, in fact, support the view that divorce greatly increases 
the likelihood of poverty. 
This paper also uses the sex of the first-born child as an instrument for marital 
breakup and then conducts IV analysis to separate the causal effects of divorce from its 
well-known correlations.  With data from the 1980 U.S. Census, we document that 
having a female first-born child slightly, but robustly, increases the probability that a 
woman’s first marriage breaks up.  In our sample, the likelihood that a woman’s first 
marriage is broken is 0.63 percentage points higher if her first child is a girl, representing 
a 3.7 percent increase from a base likelihood of 17.2 percentage points.  A discussion of 
the mechanisms that drive this instrument, and detailed investigations into its validity and 
robustness, can be found in Bedard and Deschenes (2005) and in Dahl and Moretti 
(2004).   
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Unlike these previous papers, however, we use an Abadie (2003) IV estimation 
strategy that allows us to look at the impact of marital breakup throughout the income 
distribution.  Using this technique, we find that marital breakup significantly affects the 
household income distribution.  In particular, it dramatically increases the probability that 
a mother will end up with very low income.   
It follows logically that divorce increases the probability of living in a household 
without other earners.  In fact, we estimate that breakup of the first marriage greatly 
increases the likelihood that a woman lives in a household with less than $5000 of annual 
income from others—the likelihood rises from 4 percent for those whose first marriage is 
intact to 46 percent for those whose first marriage breaks up.   
Women can and do respond to income loss from divorce by combining with other 
households, through paths including remarriage or moving in with a roommate, sibling, 
or parents.   Moreover, women further compensate through private (e.g. alimony and 
child support) and public (e.g. welfare) transfers, and by increasing their own labor 
supply.  Since, further, divorce reduces family size as well as income, the net effect of the 
husband’s departure on the household’s income-to-needs ratio is ex ante ambiguous.  In 
other words, it is therefore possible for a woman to entirely offset the loss of her 
husband’s income so that her material well-being is undiminished.   
When examining the entire income distribution, however, we find that these 
responses, although substantial, are often insufficient to prevent poverty.  While virtually 
none of the women influenced by our instrument who remain in their first marriage are in 
poverty, nearly a quarter (24 percent) of those who divorce are in poverty.   In fact, IV 
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results suggest that divorce causes increases in poverty at least as large as those suggested 
by observed correlation.   
We show that the lack of effect at the mean (Bedard and Deschenes 2005) comes 
from the fact that the cumulative distribution functions of income of women who remain 
married and those who divorce cross each other—we find evidence that some women 
who divorce, rather than moving lower in the income distribution, move towards the top 
of the income distribution, possibly due to strong labor and re-marriage market outcomes.  
We conclude that breakup of the first marriage increases the variance of income, even 
though there is no significant effect on the mean.  Because breakup of the first marriage 
leads some women to have higher incomes as well as leading more women to be poor, 
estimates that focus on the mean do not detect the dramatic effect that divorce has on the 
income distribution—that, while divorce does not affect average income, it does 
exacerbate inequality and poverty. 
After discussing our findings, we consider the potential macro implications of the 
relationship we identify between divorce and poverty.  In recent decades, mothers’ 
poverty rates have failed to decline as much as the overall rate.  Can the increase in the 
proportion of divorced women in the U.S. explain this stagnation?  We calculate that, in 
fact, the poverty rate of women with children today is substantially higher than it would 
be if divorce had not risen over the post-1980 period. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In section 2, we describe the data and the sample 
we use. In section 3, we describe the estimation strategy.  In section 4, we discuss the 
results.  In section 5, we conclude. 
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2. Data 
We use data on women living with minor children from the 5 percent 1980 
Census file (Ruggles and Sobek 2003), which allow us sufficient power to identify the 
effect of sex of the first-born child on marital breakup.3  We limit our sample to white 
women who are living with all of their children, whose eldest child is under 17, who had 
their first birth after marriage, after age 18 and before age 45, and had a single first birth.  
These limitations are necessary in order to create a sample for which measurement error 
in the sex of the observed first-born child has a classical structure.  Bedard and 
Deschenes (2005) take a similar although not identical approach to sample limitation, and 
get estimates very close to ours; Dahl and Moretti (2004) show a variety of samples, the 
most similar of which gives first-stage estimates that are very close to ours.  For further 
discussion of the sample construction, see the Appendix. 
   
3. Estimation Framework 
In a standard IV framework, income is affected by the breakup of the first 
marriage, which is treated as a classic endogenous regressor: 
uUXZD +++= 321)1( ααα  
εβββ +++= 321)2( UXDY  
      
The right-hand-side variable of interest in equation (2), D , is a dummy for the 
breakup of the first marriage.  We consider a woman as having her first marriage intact if 
she reported both that she was “currently married with spouse present” and that she had 
                                                 
3 While earlier censuses have these measures, in previous decades the divorce rate was very low.  
Subsequent censuses, on the other hand, do not have all of the measures necessary to conduct the 
analysis.  
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been married exactly once.  We consider a woman as having her first marriage broken if 
she: has been married multiple times, is married but currently not living with her 
husband, is currently separated from her husband, is currently divorced, or is currently 
widowed.4  
Our main outcomes, Y , are total others’ income, defined as total household 
income less total own income; household income; household income as a percent of the 
poverty line; and, in some specifications, hours worked last year.  The change in others’ 
income measures the direct effect on a woman of losing her husband’s income (to the 
extent that the husband is not replaced by other wage earners).  The change in total 
household income captures this direct effect but also includes the indirect effects of 
divorce on income: transfers from the ex-husband in the form of alimony and child 
support;5 transfers from the state in the form of cash assistance; and income generated by 
changes in the woman’s own labor supply.  In some specifications we add these sources 
of income into our outcome measures sequentially.  The measure of household income as 
a percent of the poverty line allows an adjustment for the change in need that 
accompanies a change in household size. 
Our controls, denoted by X , are a vector of pre-determined demographic 
variables including age, age squared, age at first birth and a dummy for high-school 
                                                 
4 We have run the analysis with ever-divorced, rather than first marriage broken, as the 
explanatory variable:  in this case, widows and those separated from or not living with their first 
husband are coded as 0 rather than 1.  Our results are not sensitive to this difference in 
categorization.   
It is not possible to systematically remove widows from the sample, since the data do not allow 
us to identify those whose first marriage ended in death among those who have had multiple 
marriages.  In any event, since widowhood is endogenous to both socioeconomic status and 
marital duration, it is probably not desirable to exclude widows. 
5 The 1980 Census question reads: “Unemployment compensation, veterans' payments, pensions, 
alimony or child support, or any other sources of income received regularly… Exclude lump-sum 
payments such as money from an inheritance or the sale of a home.” 
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dropout.6  While our Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of the relationship between 
marital breakup and income may be sensitive to their inclusion, our IV specifications are 
robust to controls (results without controls are available upon request).  We think of U as 
representing unobserved factors such as human capital, views on gender roles, and taste 
for non-market work relative to market work and leisure.  Finally, our instrumental 
variable, Z , is an indicator for having a girl as one’s firstborn child. 
To address concerns both about omitted variable bias and about reverse causality, 
we estimate equation )2(  using two-stage least squares, employing the sex of the eldest 
child ( Z ) as an instrument for whether the first marriage is broken ( D ).  Angrist and 
Imbens (1994) show that in the absence of covariates and given the standard two-stage 
least squares assumptions,7 the IV approach identifies the local average treatment effect: 
 ]|[
]0|[]1|[
]0|[]1|[
)(
),()3( 0101,1 DDYYEZDEZDE
ZYEZYE
DVar
YDCov
IV >−=
=−=
=−=
==β  
Here 1Y  and 0Y  denote the income (or other dependent variable) for women 
whose first marriage is broken and intact, respectively. 1D  is an indicator for whether a 
woman would divorce if her first child were a girl; 0D  is an indicator for whether she 
would divorce if her first child were a boy.  1D  and 0D  are hypothetical constructs; in 
practice we can only observe the indicator for the child sex that is realized.  
IV1β  therefore measures the change in income due to divorce for women whose first 
marriage breaks up if they have a girl and remains intact if they have a boy.   
                                                 
6 Since we look only at women who gave birth to their first child after age 19, we can reasonably 
assume that the decision on whether to graduate from high school is made prior to the realization 
of the sex of the first-born child. 
7 The assumptions are: conditional independence of Z , exclusion of the instrument, existence of 
a first stage and monotonicity—see Abadie (2002).  The result can be generalized for the case 
with covariates.  
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However, this approach only identifies the local average treatment effect.  We 
consider more flexible specifications in which we estimate the effect of marital breakup 
on the probability that a woman’s income is below various thresholds.  This enables us to 
identify the marginal effect of marital breakup on the cumulative distribution function 
(CDF).  In addition, we obtain estimators of the CDF itself for women whose first 
marriage is broken and for those whose first marriage is intact.  Doing so allows us to 
evaluate the magnitude of the effect of divorce throughout the income distribution. 
To estimate the CDF, we apply a technique developed in Abadie (2002, 2003).  
Recall that the local average treatment effect formula in equation )3(  gave the causal 
effect of treatment on the compliers, ]|[ 0101 DDYYE >− .  Similarly, Abadie (2002, 2003) 
demonstrates that in absence of covariates and with the same assumptions as the standard 
two-stage least squares model:8 
]0|)1[(]1|)1[(
]0|)1[(]1|)1[(]|[)4( 010
=−−=−
=−−=−
=>
ZDEZDE
ZYDEZYDEDDYE  
We can similarly estimate the following equation using two-stage least squares 
with controls, using the sex of the eldest child as an instrument: 
μδγ ++−=− XDYD )1()1()5(  
This strategy gives a consistent estimator: 
];|[ˆ)6( 010 DDXYEIV >=→ γγ  
                                                 
8 Proof of equation )4( : ZZ YYDDiZ =⇒=⇒=  for 1,0=i , so the numerator is:  
]0|)1[(]1|)1[( =−−=− ZYDEZYDE  ])1()1[( 0011 YDYDE −−−=  
By the monotonicity assumption this equals:  
][]|[][]|)1()1[( 0101001010011 DDPDDYEDDPDDYDYDE >>=>>−−−  
Dividing by the denominator yields: ]|[ 010 DDYE > .   
Since X is discrete, this proof can be extended to the case where we add controls.  
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That is, γ  gives the expected value of Y  for compliers who have a boy (and whose 
marriage therefore remains intact). When we apply this method to the case where Y  is 
the CDF of the income distribution we can effectively trace out the CDF for compliers 
who have boys.  Similarly, we could estimate the CDF for compliers who have girls.9  
But a standard two-stage least squares estimate of the effect of marital breakup on an 
indicator for a given income level gives the difference between the two CDFs.  Thus, by 
summing the standard coefficient and the estimate of equation )6( , we can likewise trace 
out the CDF for compliers who have girls.  Finally, we also estimate equation )6(  using 
OLS, and compare it to the instrumental variables estimate. 
 
4. Results 
The first column of Table 1 gives the estimated relationship between the sex of 
the first-born child and marital status for our sample.  We find that having a girl increases 
the probability of breakup of the first marriage by about 0.63 percent; due to the large 
sample size, this effect is measured very precisely.10  The effect of sex of the eldest child 
on the breakup of the first marriage is bigger than that on being currently divorced, which 
is 0.20 percent, because many of the women who divorced due to having a girl 
subsequently remarry (an endogenous response that is not properly part of our IV 
analysis).  It is important to keep in mind that we are not estimating the effect of being 
                                                 
9  By estimating the equation: ηρθ ++= XDDY  we can get ];|[ˆ 011 DDXYEIV >=→ θθ . 
The proof is similar. 
10 We have also replicated this result using  the Current Population Survey 1980, 1985, 1990, and 
1995 Fertility Supplements, which identify the sex of a woman’s actual firstborn child regardless 
of whether that child is still in the household,  and hence require no sample restrictions.  The CPS 
estimate of 0.68 percent is highly similar to that from our Census sample.  Similarly, Bedard and 
Deschenes (2005), using a slightly different sample, derive an estimate of 0.80, with a standard 
error of 0.10. 
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currently divorced or of residing in a mother-only household on economic outcomes.  
Rather, we are estimating the effect of having ever been divorced on current outcomes. 
Cross-sectional (OLS) regressions of the relationship between marital breakup 
and various measures of income and labor supply (shown in the second column of Table 
1), which admit no causal interpretation, show that breakup of the first marriage is 
correlated with large losses in income and large increases in labor supply.  These 
relationships confirm the conventional view that women whose first marriages end are 
significantly worse off than women whose first marriages remain intact. 
Two-stage least squares estimates, on the other hand, suggest that the mean effect 
of marital breakup on material well-being is quite different from the cross-sectional 
results.  The two-stage estimate of the effect of divorce on others’ income is negative but 
insignificant, though still within two standard deviations of the OLS estimates, as is the 
two-stage estimate for log household income.  The two-stage estimate of the effect of 
divorce on household income level, however, is significantly more positive than the OLS 
estimate—while the coefficient is not statistically different from zero, it is more than two 
standard deviations above the negative OLS estimate.  
Taken together, these results imply that on average there is negative selection into 
divorce—women who would have had low income anyway are more likely to divorce, 
creating a negative cross-sectional correlation between income and divorce—and that 
there is no significant causal effect of divorce on mean income.  These findings are all 
consistent with the findings of Bedard and Deschenes (2005).11 
                                                 
11 Bedard and Deschenes (2005) concentrate on a measure they call “standardized household 
income,” which adjusts household income for household size using guidelines from the Census 
Bureau.  Using this measure, they find a significant positive effect of divorce on average 
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 The difference in sign between the IV estimates of the effect of divorce on mean 
log income and on mean level of income leads us to investigate the possibility that there 
are important effects of marital breakup on the income distribution, particularly at the 
bottom, that aren’t evident at the mean.  In fact, it makes intuitive sense that the effect of 
divorce on the income distribution would be to fatten the lower tail, rather than to shift 
the entire distribution uniformly downward.  After all, divorce—and the implied 
withdrawal of the husband’s income—represents a discrete fall in income.  To the extent 
that women remarry, move in with other relatives, or have high earning potential, many 
may end up as well off financially as before (or even better off)—resulting in little effect 
of divorce on the mean of the distribution.  And yet a subset of women who cannot 
recover from the loss could experience a much greater than average effect of divorce, and 
end up moving near the bottom of the distribution. 
In Tables 2 and 3, the columns of results labeled “First marriage intact” report the 
CDF for those who remain married, estimated using the method described above.  (Recall 
that in the two-stage least squares regressions, the CDFs are estimated for the specific 
group of women—“compliers”—who divorce or stay married in response to the sex of 
the first-born child.)  The columns labeled “Difference in CDFs: broken – intact” report 
the estimated difference in CDFs between the compliers who have divorced and those 
who stay married, which is the standard coefficient on breakup in the OLS or two-stage 
least squares estimation. 
OLS estimates of the difference in distribution of income by marital breakup (first 
two columns in Table 2) tell a familiar story.  Divorce is associated with being much less 
                                                                                                                                                 
outcomes.  In an earlier, unpublished version of that paper, however, they reported results for 
total household income, and, like us, found an insignificant positive effect of divorce. 
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likely to have $5000, $10,000, $20,000 or $30,000 in income from others in the 
household; the same is true for any threshold of total household income.  In cross-section, 
those with broken first marriages have income distributions —both household and 
others’— that are first-order stochastically dominated by those of women with intact first 
marriages.  That is, divorce is correlated with a shift downward in income at every point 
in the income distribution.12 
The two-stage least squares estimates, in the right panel of Table 2, give a more 
nuanced picture.13  We do in fact find a large effect of marital breakup on the probability 
of being at the bottom of the income distribution: women whose first marriage is broken 
are 42 percentage points more likely (about twelve times as likely) to have less than 
$5000 in others’ income, and 23 percentage points more likely (about 80 percent more 
likely) to have less than $10,000.  While legal transfers (which include child support and 
mean-tested transfers) reduce the number of compliers with no income, over a quarter of 
the divorced compliers have no unearned income even after accounting for transfers—
compared to virtually none of the compliers who stay married. 
The analysis of household income, which adds in own earnings, similarly shows a 
large effect of marital breakup on the density at the bottom of the income distribution.  
                                                 
12 Note also that the estimated income distribution for compliers whose first marriage remains 
intact is first-order stochastically dominated by the income distribution for the full sample. This 
result, which holds throughout Tables 4-6, is consistent with the view that the people who 
respond to the instrument are typically of relatively low SES. 
13 Note that the estimation of linear probability models results in some estimates that are slightly 
outside the [0,1] interval, though always well within two standard errors of this interval. Despite 
this drawback, we prefer to follow this methodology because of its transparency. 
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Roughly one in six of those who experience marital breakup have less than $5000 in 
household income, compared to virtually none of those who remain married.14   
Interestingly, the two-stage estimates also show that those who divorce due to the 
instrument are somewhat more likely to have income near the top of the distribution, 
although the differences are not statistically significant.  The reversal in the sign of the 
difference occurs at (in the case of others’ income) or below (in the case of household 
income) the mean of the distribution, explaining why models for the mean find little 
effect of marital breakup on income.  Figure 2 illustrates the phenomenon.  Previous 
literature (Mueller and Pope 1980) finds that when divorced women remarry, their 
second husband is typically more educated and has a higher occupational SES score.  In 
addition, Bedard and Deschenes (2005) argue that many divorced mothers co-reside with 
their parents who, due to lifecycle effects, have higher incomes than their husbands did.15  
The reversal in sign is more substantial for total household income than for others’ 
income, mostly due to top-end variation in women’s earnings. 
The results discussed so far ignore one important aspect of divorce—namely, it 
reduces family size.  Thus even if a woman loses income through divorce, she may not 
necessarily end up worse off if there are also fewer family members to support.  On the 
other hand, if income gains at the top come heavily through combining households, the 
effect may be neutralized by increased family size.  To estimate the effect of divorce on 
                                                 
14 Although they cannot earn enough to make up for the loss in others’ income, divorced 
compliers do have a very large labor supply response to the loss.  Since the distributional effect 
on hours does not differ markedly from the mean responsiveness, a separate analysis is not 
included here.  
15 Bedard and Deschenes split their sample into those whose oldest child is under 12 years of age 
and those whose oldest child is 12 to 16; they find that the effect on others’ income is important 
mostly for those with older children, who they argue are less likely to combine households.  We, 
similarly, find that the negative effect of divorce is greater for those with older children (results 
available from the authors). 
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the ratio of income to needs, we divide each woman’s total household income by the 
poverty line for a household of that size.   
As shown in Table 3, we find that changes in family size do not fully offset the 
effect of marital breakup on household income.  The OLS estimates still indicate that 
marital breakup decreases normalized household income at all levels. The two-stage least 
squares results show that virtually none of those still in their first marriage have 
household income below the poverty line, while nearly a quarter of those whose first 
marriage ended are below poverty. Compliers whose first marriage ended are, however, 
significantly more likely to be above 400 percent of poverty than are compliers whose 
first marriage remains intact.  
 
5. Discussion 
Our results suggest that negative selection into divorce accounts for the observed 
relationship between marital breakup and lower mean income.  Yet marital breakup does 
have a significant causal effect on the distribution of income: divorce increases the 
percent of women at the bottom—and perhaps at the top—tail of the income distribution.  
In net, divorce does cause an increase in poverty, and perhaps also inequality, for women 
with children.   
What would have been the poverty rate of women with children in 1995 had the 
fraction of ever-divorced mothers not changed since 1980?  In 1995 (the most recent year 
for which we have data on marital history from the CPS), the poverty rate for women 
with our sample characteristics who are still in their first marriage was 8.7 percent, while 
the rate for women who have ever divorced was 21.7 percent.  Thus if divorce had stayed 
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at its 1980 prevalence (17.2 percent ever divorced), the overall poverty rate in this sample 
would be:  
 
Counterfactual poverty rate = (% ever divorced 1980)*(poverty rate | ever divorced 1995)  
 
+ (% never divorced 1980)*(poverty rate | never divorced 1995)  
 
= 0.172*0.217 + (1-0.172)*0.087 = 0.109,  
 
or 10.9 percent.  Because the prevalence of divorce rose to 28.6 percent, the poverty rate 
became: 
 
Actual poverty rate       =      (% ever divorced 1995)*(poverty rate | ever divorced 1995)  
 
  + (% never divorced 1995)*(poverty rate | never divorced 1995)  
 
  = 0.286*0.217 + (1-0.286)*0.087 = 0.124, 
 
or 12.4 percent.  Thus the increase in divorce may potentially have caused an increase of 
1.5 points, or 13.8 percent, in the poverty rate for women with our sample characteristics.  
If we assume that the effect holds outside of those with our sample characteristics, we can 
conclude that nearly 1.4 million more women and children were in poverty in 1995 than 
would have been if the divorce rate had remained at its 1980 level.  
Our results also suggest a relationship between rising divorce and the widening of 
the income distribution.  Previous literature has not emphasized the relationship between 
divorce and inequality, although both have increased substantially over the past three 
decades.  Much of the recent literature on the causes of inequality has focused on wage 
inequality and the forces that may be affecting it, such as: technology (Acemoglu 2002); 
the decline of labor market institutions (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996); and the rise 
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of international trade. Our findings suggest that the decline of the traditional family unit 
as an institution may have contributed to the rise in income inequality.   
 
Data Appendix 
The 5 percent 1980 Census data contain several measures that allow us to analyze 
a woman’s fertility history.  These include the number of children ever born to a woman, 
the number of marriages, the quarter as well as year of first birth, and the quarter and year 
of first marriage. This information permits us to identify the sex of the first-born child for 
most women, although not for women whose eldest child has left the household.       
A substantial drawback of using cross-sectional data is the fact that we can only 
observe the sex of the oldest child who resides with the mother, whereas ideally we 
would want to observe the sex of the firstborn child.  It is important that we create a 
sample of women for whom measurement error in the sex of the observed first-born child 
has a classical structure.   
 To that end, we attempt to restrict the sample to those women observed with all 
their biological children.  We do so in order to limit the risk that our results will be 
affected by differential attrition of boys and girls.  In particular, we are concerned that 
boys are differentially likely to end up in the custody of their fathers in the event of 
marital breakup.  This pattern could lead to endogeneity of our instrument if the sample 
were left uncorrected.  If, in the event of divorce, fathers keep the sons and mothers keep 
the daughters, there will be a spurious positive correlation in the overall sample between 
marital breakup and the eldest observed child being a girl.  
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 To address this issue, we exclude any woman for whom the number of children 
ever born does not equal the number of children living with her.  If a mother lives with 
stepchildren or adopted children in a number that exactly offsets the number of her own 
children that are not living with her, this rule will fail to exclude her.  We therefore 
further minimize the possibility of including women who have non-biological children 
“standing in” for biological children by including only women whose age at first birth is 
measured as between 19 and 44.  
Limiting our sample to women who live with all their children reduces the threat 
that differential custody rates could bias our result, but it does not eliminate this risk 
altogether, because we could still be more likely to include divorced women with two 
girls than those with one boy and one girl or those with two boys.  We have tested this 
hypothesis, however, and find that mothers living with all their children and mothers in 
the overall population are equally likely to be observed with a girl as the eldest child, 
which suggests that sex of the eldest child is not a major determinant of living with all of 
one’s children (results available from the authors). 
Second, we limit our sample to women whose first child was born after their first 
marriage, since breakup of the first marriage is our focus.  If instead we included out-of-
wedlock births, we would be concerned that the sex of the first child affected selection 
into the first marriage (Lundberg and Rose 2003).  To the extent that people could learn 
the sex of the child before it was born and thereby select into “shotgun marriages,” we 
may still have selection into first marriage.  But ultrasound technology was not yet 
widely used in 1980 (Campbell 2000), so this threat is not of particular concern.  In 
addition, because we can only identify the beginning of the first marriage and not the end, 
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we may include some women whose first child was born after the breakup of the first 
marriage. While this would weaken the first stage of our estimation, it would not bias our 
results. 
Third, we look only at mothers whose eldest child is a minor, since those who still 
live with their adult children may be a select group.  Further, since girls are differentially 
more likely to leave home early (at ages 17 and 18), we restrict to mothers whose eldest 
child is under age 17.  Fourth, we limit our sample to white women because black 
women’s childbearing and marital decisions may be quite different, and fully modeling 
the differences would greatly complicate the analysis.  Finally, we leave out women 
whose first child was a twin, both because different-sex twins would complicate our 
instrument and because twins increase the number of children a woman has.  
Selection into our restricted sample might be cause for concern, just as selection 
into the labor market is cause for concern when measuring labor outcomes.  To test for 
such a problem, we generated the predicted probability that a woman was included in our 
sample based on age and birthplace dummies. Then we re-ran our two-stage estimates, 
treating a woman’s predicted probability of inclusion as an endogenous regressor.  Our 
first- and second-stage estimates were quite stable with and without this variable. 
Table A shows summary statistics for our full sample relative to the overall 
population of women with minor children.  Our sample is quite similar to the overall 
population except in terms of age and marital status.  The women in our sample are 
younger than average, consistent with the requirement that a woman’s eldest child is 
under 17.  The women in our sample are also slightly less likely to be divorced, both 
because they are younger and because we require that they have custody of all children. 
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And of course, unlike the overall population, women in our sample cannot be never-
married. On other characteristics, however, the two groups differ little: women in our 
sample have slightly more education and household income than the overall population 
and work and earn slightly less. 
In summary, the limitations we place on the sample are designed to create a group 
of women for whom we can measure the sex of the firstborn child with only classical 
measurement error.  These restrictions weaken the power of our first stage, but we 
believe this compromise is necessary in order to minimize concerns about endogeneity of 
our instrument. 
In addition to estimating our model on the full sample, we looked specifically at 
two subsamples that we used in specification checks: those who are at high risk of having 
ever divorced and those at low risk of having ever divorced. To create our high- and low-
predicted divorce subsamples, we created an exogenous risk index by predicting “ever 
divorced” using age, age squared, age at first birth, and dummies for place of birth and 
for high school dropouts (recall that our sample includes only women whose first birth 
occurs after age 19, so the decision on whether to graduate from high school can be 
treated as pre-determined).  The high-risk subsample included women whose predicted 
risk is in the top quartile; the low-risk subsample included women whose predicted risk is 
in the bottom quartile.  These subsamples allowed us to test our IV strategy: if the 
responsiveness to the child-sex instrument is proportional to the overall level of divorce, 
then we expect the first stage to be larger for this group. As a consequence, the two-stage 
effect of child sex on outcomes should also be more precise for the high-divorce 
subsample, if indeed our IV strategy is valid and child sex is affecting outcomes.  We 
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have tested this hypothesis, and that is indeed what we find (results available from the 
authors). 
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Table 1.  Mean Regressions 
     
 First stage  Second stage 
Dependent variable 
Instrument: first child is a 
girl  OLS 2SLS 
First marriage is broken 0.0063    
 (0.0010)    
Currently divorced 0.0020    
 (0.0007)    
Ln(Household income)   -0.501 -0.230 
   (0.005) (0.437) 
Others' income   -9241 -1041 
   (42.57) (5178) 
Household income   -5577 6548 
   (43.41) (5570) 
Hours worked last year   420 1053 
     (2.85) (360) 
NOTE: N=619,499.  The  sample includes white women who are living with all of their 
children, whose eldest child is under 17, who had their first birth after marriage, after 
age 18 and before age 45, and had a single first birth.  All the regressions include the 
following controls: age, age squared, age at first birth and a dummy for high school 
dropouts.  There were 4,766 observations, or about 0.77% of our observations, for 
which household income was zero or negative.  For those observations we set 
Ln(Household income) to zero.  Income is in 1980 dollars.  Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. 
 
  
 
Table 2. Cumulative Distribution of Income by Marital Status 
 OLS  2SLS 
Dependent Variable 
CDF when 
first marriage 
is intact 
Difference in 
CDFs:    
broken-intact  
CDF when 
first marriage 
is intact 
Difference in 
CDFs:    
broken-intact 
Others' income           ≤$5000  0.0507 0.3928  0.0378 0.4177 
 (0.0003) (0.0014)  (0.0785) (0.1202) 
≤$10000 0.1458 0.3850  0.2770 0.2284 
 (0.0005) (0.0015)  (0.1270) (0.1567) 
≤$20000 0.5459 0.2226  0.8751 -0.0416 
 (0.0008) (0.0014)  (0.1814) (0.1937) 
≤$30000 0.8412 0.0754  1.0369 -0.0821 
  (0.0006) (0.0010)  (0.1323) (0.1399) 
      
+ private transfers      ≤$5000  0.0500 0.3572  0.0319 0.4110 
 (0.0003) (0.0014)  (0.0780) (0.1193) 
≤$10000 0.1441 0.3667  0.2546 0.2196 
 (0.0005) (0.0015)  (0.1259) (0.1560) 
≤$20000 0.5437 0.2137  0.8649 -0.0608 
 (0.0008) (0.0014)  (0.1812) (0.1947) 
≤$30000 0.8403 0.0714  1.0569 -0.1085 
  (0.0006) (0.0010)  (0.1334) (0.1414) 
      
+ public transfers       ≤$5000  0.0490 0.3418  0.0327 0.3776 
 (0.0003) (0.0014)  (0.0773) (0.1183) 
≤$10000 0.1432 0.3625  0.2506 0.2222 
 (0.0005) (0.0015)  (0.1255) (0.1557) 
≤$20000 0.5434 0.2114  0.8581 -0.0610 
 (0.0008) (0.0014)  (0.1809) (0.1948) 
≤$30000 0.8402 0.0706  1.0524 -0.1108 
  (0.0006) (0.0010)  (0.1333) (0.1415) 
      
(+ own earnings=)      
household income     ≤$5000  0.0294 0.0982  -0.0155 0.1900 
 (0.0005) (0.0007)  (0.0603) (0.0865) 
≤$10000 0.0921 0.1999  0.1502 0.2875 
 (0.0008) (0.0010)  (0.1024) (0.1312) 
≤$20000 0.3994 0.2153  0.7760 -0.2547 
 (0.0013) (0.0015)  (0.1806) (0.2048) 
≤$30000 0.7496 0.0788  1.1079 -0.2360 
  (0.0012) (0.0013)  (0.1621) (0.1729) 
NOTE: N=619,499.  The sample includes white women who are living with all of their children, whose eldest 
child is under 17, who had their first birth after marriage, after age 18 and before age 45, and had a single first 
birth. All the regressions include the following controls: age, age squared, age at first birth and a dummy for 
high school dropouts. Income is in 1980 dollars.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
  
 
Table 3. Cumulative Distribution of Poverty, by Marital Status 
  OLS  2SLS 
       
Dependent Variable   
CDF when 
first 
marriage is 
intact 
Difference 
in CDFs:    
broken-
intact   
CDF when 
first 
marriage is 
intact 
Difference 
in CDFs:    
broken-
intact 
Percentage of the 
poverty threshold            
≤100  0.0565 0.1322  0.0041 0.2407 
  (0.0004) (0.0011)  (0.0806) (0.1081) 
≤200  0.2224 0.2069  0.2958 0.2487 
  (0.0006) (0.0015)  (0.1449) (0.1684) 
≤300  0.5051 0.1550  0.8077 -0.1800 
  (0.0008) (0.0015)  (0.1824) (0.2011) 
≤400  0.7349 0.0780  1.2086 -0.4442 
    (0.0007) (0.0013)   (0.1751) (0.1909) 
NOTE: N=619,499.  The sample includes white women who are living with all of their 
children, whose eldest child is under 17, who had their first birth after marriage, after age 
18 and before age 45, and had a single first birth. All the regressions include the 
following controls: age, age squared, age at first birth and a dummy for high school 
dropouts.  Poverty is calculated using 1980 measures.  Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
  
 
Table A. Descriptive Statistics—Mothers with Minor Children Living at Home 
    
 All   Our sample
Demographics    
Age 35.1  31.6 
Years of schooling 12.0  12.8 
Household income 22,747  23,114 
Total own income 4,905  4,458 
Weeks worked last year 23.9  22.5 
Usual hours worked 21.1  19.9 
    
Marital status    
Currently married, spouse present 0.802  0.891 
Currently separated 0.040  0.024 
Currently divorced 0.085  0.072 
Ever divorced 0.215  0.172 
Never married 0.043  0.000 
    
Number of observations 1,610,516   619,499 
NOTE: First column includes all women observed in the 1980 Census living with at 
least one minor child.  Second column includes white women who are living with all of 
their children, whose eldest child is under 17, who had their first birth after marriage, 
after age 18 and before age 45, and had a single first birth.  Income is in 1980 dollars. 
  
 
  
Figure 1. Mothers' Poverty Rates, by Marital Status 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Married mothers Single mothers All mothers
 
  
Figure 2.  Cumulative Distributions of Income Sources of Women with Children, by 
Marital Status 
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II.   Total Household Income 
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III.  Household Income as a Percent of Poverty 
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